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Abstract 
 
The traditional platform-centric approach to media regulation is no longer tenable with the distinct line 
between broadcast and print media being blurred by mainstream media combining text and video via the 
internet. To address platform convergence, the Law Commission recommends a universal news media 
regulator, the News Media Standards Authority, which encompasses broadcasters, the press and online-
only providers. The Commission endorses a voluntary membership model with a range of incentives to 
entice entities to join. This paper will critique the efficacy of the Commission’s incentives before 
undertaking a first principles analysis of news media regulation to illustrate the need for an element of 
compulsion in the membership model of the News Media Standards Authority. This paper argues that a 
mixed membership model, whereby a matrix of factors is used to determine the entities that will be 
required to join, is more appropriate for the News Media Standards Authority.  
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I Introduction 
 
News media plays a vital role in informing the public of news and opinion. Statutory 
privileges are granted to the news media to reflect its importance to society. 
Traditionally, the high costs associated with printing and broadcasting ensured that only 
organisations with sufficient means could disseminate information to a wide audience. 
Consequently, identifying and regulating those organisations was relatively simple. A 
platform dichotomy in regulation was justified because organisations disseminated their 
information through a single channel: print; television; or radio. Recent technological 
developments, namely the internet, have shattered those limits. Organisations are 
disseminating an array of information through multiple platforms and anyone with 
internet access can convey information to millions of people. The platform-centric 
regulatory model is being challenged by these developments.  
 
Platform convergence places the future of media regulation in question. Three broad 
questions arise in addressing this issue: 
 
 Firstly, should the news media be regulated separately from other parts of 
the media? 
 Secondly, if separate regulation of the news media is justified, how should 
news media be defined?  
 Thirdly, how should news media be regulated? 
 
The Law Commission’s (Commission) report, The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: 
Rights Responsibilities and Regulation in the Digital Age,1 looked to address these 
questions. The Commission provides a definition of news media2 and recommends 
confining the news media’s statutory privileges to members of the Commission’s 
proposed universal news media regulator, the News Media Standards Authority 
(NMSA) (Authority).3 NMSA will take a content-centric approach, rather than the 
current platform-centric approach, to media regulation in New Zealand.  
 
The Commission recommends a voluntary membership model for NMSA.4 Entities5 
that meet the definition of news media will have the choice of being subject to NMSA’s 
                                                            
1 Law Commission The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation in the 
Digital Age (NZLC R128, 2013). 
2 At [3.63]. 
3 At [7.107]. 
4 At [7.132] 
5 The term “entity” will encompass organisations and individuals throughout this paper.  
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jurisdiction.6 Joining is incentivised by statutory and non-statutory benefits exclusive to 
members.
7
 This paper will argue that NMSA should have a mixed membership model, 
rather than the proposed voluntary model, whereby certain entities will be required to 
join the Authority whilst others have the choice of joining.  
 
This paper will firstly canvas the current media regulation landscape in New Zealand. 
Looking at the status quo will portray the regulatory gap that the Commission is 
attempting to fill with NMSA.8 The Commission’s recommendations will then be 
outlined and critiqued, with the focus being on the attractiveness of the statutory 
incentives to potential members. Following this, a first principles analysis of news 
media regulation will be undertaken as the basis for this paper’s view that NMSA needs 
an element of compulsion in its membership model. A matrix of factors will be used to 
determine the entities that should be required to join NMSA. Procedural matters relating 
to the Authority’s governance and statutory formation will also be addressed. Finally, 
objections to having an element of compulsion in news media regulation will be 
rebutted.  
 
II News Media Regulation in New Zealand: The Status Quo 
  
The Broadcasting Standards Authority (BSA), established in 1989, is a state regulatory 
body that regulates television and radio broadcasters; membership is mandatory. The 
Press Council (PC), established in 1972, is a self-regulatory body that regulates the 
press; membership is voluntary. The jurisdiction of these bodies is not confined to news. 
The BSA and PC reflect the traditionally distinct methods of delivering news and 
information: printing, encompassing newspapers and magazines; and broadcasting, 
encompassing television and radio.  
 
Technological developments have enabled broadcasters and the press to deliver a range 
of content through multiple channels. The internet enables individuals to disseminate 
information at a scale and speed formerly reserved for large organisations with powerful 
distribution networks. The PC has adapted to convergence by extending its jurisdiction 
to incorporate members’ websites. However, the BSA has not and does not have the 
power to similarly extend its jurisdiction unless the government amends the 
Broadcasting Act.9 Consequently, a gap in regulation for on-demand and online-only 
broadcaster content has emerged. The newly formed Online Media Standards Authority 
                                                            
6 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.132] 
7 At [7.106]-[7.118]. 
8 At [1.49]-[1.58]. 
9 Broadcasting Act 1989, s 21.  
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(OMSA) has jurisdiction over news and current events published online by its members 
but its effectiveness cannot yet be evaluated due to its infancy.
10
 With the same content 
being available on up to three different platforms, the current regulatory framework can 
result in a consumer having to make three separate complaints to three different 
regulatory bodies for an issue with the same content. Thus, a platform-centric approach 
to media regulation is no longer sustainable.  
 
III The Law Commission’s Recommendations  
 
The Law Commission does not view the extension of either or both the PC and 
BSA to fill the regulatory gap as a viable solution due to the two bodies being 
positioned at opposite ends of the regulatory spectrum; the BSA is statutorily-based and 
the Press Council is self-regulated by the press.11 A simple extension would entrench 
“the existing regulatory inconsistencies in the current environment”.
12
 Instead, the 
Commission starts afresh and looks to define news media and how news media should 
be regulated in light of platform convergence.13 
 
A Defining News Media 
 
In the Commission’s recommendations, an entity will be a part of the news 
media when:14 
 
 a significant proportion of its publishing activities involves the generation 
and/or aggregation of news, information and opinion of current value; 
 it disseminates information to a public audience; 
 publication is regular and not occasional; and  
 the publisher is accountable to a code of ethics and complaints process. 
 
This definition will be altered in this paper’s recommendations. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
10 Online Media Standards Authority “The Rules of the Online Media Standards Authority Incorporated” 
<www.omsa.co.nz>. 
11 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.20]. 
12 At [7.20]. 
13 At [1.10]. 
14 At [3.101]. 
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B News Media Standards Authority: Overview 
  
To address platform convergence, the Commission recommends a single regulatory 
body that oversees news, information and opinion of current value across all platforms. 
NMSA will effectively assume the responsibilities of the PC, BSA and OMSA in 
relation to news content.  
 
NMSA will be self-regulated.15 A non-statutory foundation will be used for 
independence from the State (in contrast to the BSA but akin to the PC) and limits on 
industry involvement will maintain independence from the industry. The entities that 
meet the aforementioned news media definition can decide whether to be subject to the 
jurisdiction of NMSA. Those who subject themselves to the Authority’s jurisdiction 
will enjoy a number of advantages compared to those that do not. The advantages 
include:16 
 
 statutory privileges; 
 a brand advantage from being subject to codes and standards; 
 broadcasters having access to public funding; 
 exemption from the Communication Tribunal’s jurisdiction; and  
 a mediation service. 
 
The effectiveness of the proposed advantages for membership will be evaluated in turn 
to assess whether they are sufficient to induce potential members to voluntarily join.  
 
C News Media Standards Authority: Efficacy of Incentives 
  
1 Statutory privileges  
 
The statutory privileges granted to the news media can be categorised as: legal 
exemptions to aid in gathering and disseminating information; and attendance rights to 
aid in accessing information.17  
   
(a) Legal exemptions 
 
Broadcasters and the press are exempt from Fair Trading Act 1986 liability for content 
that does not relate to the supply of goods and services or advertising.18 The exemption 
                                                            
15 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.170]. 
16 At [7.106]-[7.118]. 
17 At [2.7].  
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is "drafted in such narrow terms"19 that information solely disseminated online20 or on-
demand is not encompassed in the exemption.
21
 The purpose of the exemption is to "not 
encroach upon the freedom of the press".22 If the exemption was limited to NMSA 
members, non-members would be subject to civil or criminal liability for misleading 
and deceptive conduct
23
 or false representations.
24
 Avoiding civil or criminal liability 
will provide a material incentive for news media entities to join NMSA. However, it is 
difficult to see Parliament limiting the exemption to NMSA members because the 
potential for civil or criminal liability will chill the freedom of expression of non-
members.   
  
A "news medium", in relation to its news activities, is not defined as an "agency" under 
the Privacy Act and so is not subject to the information privacy regime of the Act,25 
including its Information Privacy Principles (IPPs).
26
 The IPPs primarily address the 
collection, storage, access and use of personal information.27 The news media 
exemption recognises the "day to day practicalities of running a news organisation".28 
The news media would struggle to "effectively"29 exercise its freedom of expression30 
"if it were subject to the Privacy Act's principles"31 as the IPPs are "ill-aligned to the 
[news] media function".
32
 It is arguable whether Parliament would curtail the freedom 
of expression of non-members by restricting the exemption to NMSA members. If the 
restriction is imposed, being subject to the information privacy regime will be a material 
incentive for news media entities to join NMSA. 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                   
18 Fair Trading Act 1986, s 15.  
19 Peter McLuskie "The FTA: Alternative to Defamation" [2001] NZLJ 96 at 97.   
20 Fair Trading Act, s 15(3)(b). The definition of “newspaper” in the Films, Videos, and Publications 
Classification Act 1993 does not include online content. 
21 Fair Trading Act, s 15(3)(a). The definition of "broadcasting" in the Broadcasting Act 1989, s 2, does 
not include on-demand content. 
22 (1 July 1986) 472 NZPD 2499. 
23 Fair Trading Act, ss 9-12.  
24 Fair Trading Act, ss 13-14.  
25 Privacy Act 1993, s 2(1)(b)(xiii). Section 2 of the Privacy Act defines "news medium" and "news 
activity".  
26 Privacy Act, s 6. 
27 Privacy Act, s 6. 
28 Elizabeth Longworth and Tim McBride The Privacy Act: A Guide (GP Publications, Wellington, 1994) 
at 259. 
29 Law Commission Review of the Privacy Act 1993: Review of the Law of Privacy Stage 4 (NZLC R123, 
2011) at [4.26]. 
30 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, s14. 
31 Law Commission, above n 29, at [4.26]. 
32 At [4.26]. 
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(b) Attendance rights 
  
News media reporters are granted access to certain criminal proceedings33 and Family 
and Youth Court cases34 that the public is generally not allowed to attend. Although 
members of the public may be discretionarily granted access,
35
 the news media have the 
benefit of a statutory right. Access is granted to "enable scrutiny of the proceedings on 
behalf of the public to ensure judges remain accountable".36  
 
Accredited members of the Parliamentary Press Gallery enjoy access to special facilities 
throughout Parliament, as well as the exclusive right to report on proceedings in 
Parliament and select committees.37 The purpose of allowing access and reporting rights 
to a section of the media is to "provide specialised coverage and analysis of political and 
parliamentary news to the public".
38
 
 
It is difficult to see Parliament restricting attendance rights to NMSA members and 
removing discretionary access as this would limit the ability of non-members to hold the 
Judiciary and Parliament to account. Historically, Parliament has not limited access to 
news media on the basis of an entity being subject to an external regulatory body such 
as the BSA or PC. If access is limited to NMSA members, this is likely to be a material 
incentive to mainstream news media that look to break news. 
 
2 Brand advantage 
  
The Commission believes that “belonging to the NMSA would be a mark of 
responsibility”39 that would distinguish “a news medium from others”40 and provide 
members with a “reputational advantage”
41
 which members could kite mark their 
publications with.42  
 
                                                            
33 Criminal Procedure Act 2011, s 198(1). 
34 Family Courts Act 1980, s 11A(1)(e); Family Proceedings Act 1980, s 159(2)(ca); Children, Young 
Persons, and Their Families Act 1989, s 166(1)(na); Care of Children Act 2004, s 137(1)(g); Social 
Workers Registration Act 2003, s 80(4)(g); Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003, s 
97(4)(h). 
35 Family Courts Act, s 11A(1)(g); Family Proceedings Act, s 159(2)(d); Children, Young Persons, and 
Their Families Act, s 166(1)(o); Care of Children Act, s 137(1)(i); Social Workers Registration Act, s 
80(4)(j); Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act, s 97(4)(k). 
36 Law Commission, above n 1, at [2.8]. 
37 Rules of the Parliamentary Press Gallery 2011, r 14. 
38 New Zealand Parliament “The Parliamentary Press Gallery” (3 May 2013) <www.parliament.nz>. 
39 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.111]. 
40 At [7.111]. 
41 At [7.111]. 
42 At [7.113]. 
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A reputational advantage in a regulatory context has two sides: the member and the 
regulatory body, both of which must have a good reputation for an advantage to arise. 
Reputation is built over time and cannot simply be attained by attaching a logo to one’s 
publication or notionally joining a regulatory body. Furthermore, consumers do not rely 
on regulatory body decisions as an indicator of a programme having a good reputation. 
For example, Campbell Live, 3 News and One News were the three most complained 
about programmes in 2012,43 but are still among the country's most viewed television 
programmes.44 Moreover, entities that are currently subject to an external regulatory 
body, such as the BSA or PC, do not kite mark their publications to indicate 
membership. Thus, NMSA members are unlikely to view kite marking their publication 
to indicate membership as a material benefit.  
 
The Commission’s view of brand advantage may be confined to the idea that, 
everything else being equal, the public is more likely to consume news from a source 
that has an established formal complaints system than one that does not. However, since 
fewer than two in five people know of the existence of news media standards, an entity 
is unlikely to gain more readers or viewers from being subject to the standards of a 
regulatory body.
45
 The public is more likely to give weight to the reputation of an 
agency that has upheld high journalistic standards for an extended period of time. 
Organisations such as the British Broadcasting Corporation in Britain, the Australian 
Broadcasting Corporation in Australia and Radio New Zealand in New Zealand would 
embody such a sentiment.46 It is also uncertain how much new media actually relies on 
reputation. For example, some may in fact rely on the contrary: a niche audience that 
looks to them for a unique and untrammelled perspective on news and current affairs, 
rather than for ethically sound journalism or for having the possibility to complain to a 
regulatory body. 
 
Thus, the “brand advantage” may not be a strong incentive for potential members to join 
NMSA, particularly in its early stages when its efficacy is unproven.  
 
3 Public funding 
 
Broadcasting and production companies can apply for funding from the Broadcasting 
Commission (BC) to produce content. Production companies are the predominant 
                                                            
43 Broadcasting Standards Authority BSA Annual Report 2012 (Broadcasting Standards Authority, 
Wellington, 2012) at 58. 
44 Regan “TV Ratings: 6 September 2013” (7 September 2013) Throng <www.throng.co.nz>. 
45 Big Picture Marketing Strategy and Research Public Perception of News Media Standards and 
Accountability in New Zealand (Big Picture Research, Auckland, 2012) at [6.1]. 
46 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.111]. 
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recipients of funding.47 Funding for any programme is conditional upon the production 
company being contracted with a broadcaster.
48
 The Law Commission recommends a 
further stipulation that for a production company to be eligible to receive funding for 
news programmes, the broadcaster that the production company is contracted to must be 
a NMSA member.
49
  
 
The stipulation is likely to encourage broadcasting companies to join the Authority in 
fear of production companies contracting with other broadcasters that are NMSA 
members in order to secure funding. However, this incentive only affects broadcasters, 
which in itself is a small portion of the news media; the press will not be affected. In 
2012, the BC provided over $85,000,000 of funding for television programmes. 
Documentaries accounted for over $21,000,000 of funding but no news or current 
affairs programmes were funded.
50
 Despite the relatively wide definition of news being 
adopted by the Law Commission,51 not all documentaries would be deemed news; nor 
would other genres such as special interest and drama. Notwithstanding definitional 
discrepancies between the Law Commission and BC, the funding levels for news 
programmes may be overstated by the Law Commission.  
 
The importance, or lack thereof, of BC funding to an entity depends on the portion of its 
content being news related and the portion of that news related content being publicly 
funded. Nonetheless, having the option of seeking public funding will be an incentive 
for a production company to contract with a broadcaster that is a member of NMSA, 
and consequently an incentive for a broadcaster to become a member of NMSA.  
 
4 Communication regime jurisdiction 
 
In response to the Law Commission's Ministerial Briefing paper on harmful digital 
communications,52  the government will adopt a two-step approach to dealing with harm 
caused by harmful digital publications.
53
 Complaints will initially be adjudicated by an 
approved agency (Agency).54 Subsequently, appeals can be made to the District Court.55 
                                                            
47 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.115]. 
48 At [7.115]. 
49 At [7.117]. 
50 NZ On Air “Funding Decisions” <www.nzonair.govt.nz>. 
51 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.40]. 
52 Law Commission Harmful Digital Communications: The adequacy of the current sanctions and 
remedies (NZLC Ministerial Briefing Paper, 2012). 
53 Cabinet Social Policy Committee Harmful Digital Communications: Cabinet Social Policy Committee 
Paper. 
54 At [38]. 
55 At [45]. 
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The Commission recommends exempting NMSA members from the jurisdiction of this 
communications regime.
56
  
 
Not being subject to the communications regime is arguably not a material incentive. To 
make a complaint to the Agency, the complainant must have exhausted all other 
avenues of complaint. With many websites having internal censorship and moderation 
systems as well as in-house complaint procedures that deal with harmful contributors, 
the portion of complaints that reach the Agency could be relatively low. Additionally, 
large amounts of content consumed by New Zealanders originate from overseas where 
the regime has no jurisdiction.
57
 Remedially, the Agency and District Court cannot 
order damages.58 
 
Conceptually, it is not a benefit for an entity to avoid the jurisdiction of the 
communications regime. NMSA’s proposed standards and codes are stricter than the 
principles set out for the regime.59 Under NMSA, a member has to meet standards of 
accuracy, correction of error, separation of fact and opinion, balance, fairness and 
privacy.60 The communication regime’s principles broadly cover these factors. 
However, in contrast to the regime, the Authority's standards will be tailored to different 
news mediums to ensure comprehensive coverage and methods of gathering 
information will also be subject to scrutiny.61 On a practical note, several of the 
regime’s principles are aimed at addressing behaviour that the news media is not 
engaged in, such as inciting harmful messages or publishing menacing material. Thus, 
the news media may be indifferent to being subject to these principles because they are 
unlikely to breach them.  
 
5 Mediation service 
  
NMSA will provide a mediation service to encourage settlement without litigation. 
Mediation services by media regulatory bodies have been favourably received overseas, 
such as the Press Complaints Commission’s mediation service in the United Kingdom.62 
However, regardless of the availability of a mediation service, it is contingent on both 
parties voluntarily engaging in mediation. Thus, if entities do not partake in mediation, 
the service will not be an incentive to join NMSA.  
                                                            
56 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.114]. 
57 Cabinet Social Policy Committee, above n 53, [59]. 
58 At [56].  
59 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.46]-[7.62]. 
60 At [7.57]. Standards of good taste and decency will still be administered by the BSA, at [7.44]. 
61 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.60]-[7.61]. 
62 Philip Ward “Press Regulation – the Debate” (House of Commons Library Note SN/HA/6357, 2012) at 
[2.6].  
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D News Media Standards Authority: Leverage  
  
Media ownership in New Zealand is highly concentrated. Fairfax Media New Zealand 
and APN News Media control around 90 per cent of newspaper publications63 and Sky 
Television has a monopoly on pay television with only three main competitors in free-
to-air television.64 The efficacy of NMSA will ultimately hinge on these organisations 
voluntarily joining the Authority. If they do not join, the whole regulatory system will 
be undermined by a large section of the news media being unregulated. Voluntary 
membership raises concerns about the leverage large media organisations may have 
over the establishment of the Authority and its on-going operations. 
 
The threat of not being a member is the primary form of leverage that entities have over 
NMSA. An entity can be a non-member of NMSA by not joining the Authority in the 
first instance or by withdrawing subsequent to joining, either by breaching the proposed 
five year membership contract or not renewing the contract after five years. Non-
members can continue to publish as they please, as long as they are in line with the 
law.65 The proposed five year contracts between the Authority and its members 
somewhat mitigates the threat of member withdrawal upon an adverse decision, 
particularly when contract termination will be limited to situations where an entity 
merges, is acquired or becomes insolvent.66 Despite this, with the Authority being 
principally funded by its members,
67
 there is an opportunity for the news media industry 
to unduly influence, or at least be perceived to unduly influence, NMSA with the threat 
of withdrawal materially impacting the Authority’s funding, depending on the entity 
that withdraws. 
 
Whilst NMSA is being formed, large entities could premise their membership on certain 
conditions, such as specific individuals being a part of the governance structure or even 
that the Authority's codes and standards are outlined in a manner that suits them. For 
example, in the United Kingdom the most powerful press organisations are pressuring 
parliament to set up a press regulator that is self-regulated by the industry, rather than 
the approach agreed to by parliament to have an element of independent regulation, 
following the Leveson Inquiry.68   
                                                            
63 Bill Rosenberg “News Media Ownership in New Zealand: Who Owns What?” (13 September 2008) 
<www.converge.org.nz>. 
64 Bill Rosenberg, above n 63. 
65 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.168]. 
66 At [7.95]. 
67 At [7.93]. 
68 Hacked Off “What’s wrong with the press bosses’ latest regulation proposal?” (12 July 2013) 
<www.hackinginquiry.org>; The Rt Hon Lord Justice Leveson Report of An Inquiry into the Culture, 
Practice and Ethics of the Press (The Stationary Office, London, 2012). 
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Once formed, adjudicating complaints will be one of NMSA’s primary functions. The 
possibility of withdrawal could influence the Authority’s decision making. In 2011, Sun 
Media, Canada’s largest newspaper publisher withdrew all its publications from the 
Ontario Press Council (OPC) because of the Council’s “politically correct mentality”.69 
The OPC is a voluntary self-regulatory body,
70
 where media organisations may 
withdraw by simply giving a year’s notice of such intent.71 The withdrawal of Sun 
Media caused the Council to make “significant budget cuts”.72 There were no legal 
ramifications for Sun Media from the withdrawal. In comparison, the membership 
regime for NMSA is more concrete than the OPC’s with five year contracts and limited 
opportunities for withdrawal once contracted. However, an entity not renewing its 
membership upon the contract expiring would, depending on the size of the entity that 
withdraws, cause similar levels of disruption to NMSA.  
 
News media proprietors in New Zealand may also share the sentiment of Richard 
Desmond when he withdrew one of the Britain's largest newspaper publishers, Northern 
& Shell, from the Press Complaints Commission.73  Desmond indicated that he “no 
longer saw value in remaining in the regulatory system”74 and that Northern & Shell 
could “operate the principles of self-regulation themselves”.
75
 
 
IV First Principles 
 
The right to freedom of expression is protected in New Zealand by s 14 of the Bill of 
Rights Act.76 NMSA is placing restrictions on the right to freedom of expression by 
setting standards that members must follow ex-ante and imposing penalties for 
breaching standards ex-post. Such restrictions need to be “demonstrably justified in a 
free and democratic society”77 because the proposed mixed membership model will be 
statutorily-based and so “prescribed by law”.78  
 
                                                            
69 Allison Jones “Sun Media ditches press council, citing issues with ‘political correctness’” The Toronto 
Star (13 July 2011) <www.thestar.com>. 
70 Ontario Press Council “Constitution” (2010) <www.ontpress.com>, at art II.  
71 At art II(B)(2).  
72 Don McCurdy “Executive Director’s 2012 Report” Ontario Press Council (5 January 2013) 
<www.ontpress.com>.  
73 Ian Burrell “Desmond withdraws his titles from press complaints regulation” The Independent (12 
January 2011) <www.theindependent.co.uk>. 
74 Ian Burrell, above n 75. 
75 Ian Burrell, above n 75. 
76 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 14. 
77 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
78 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
 
 
15 
 
For regulation to be “demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society”,79 the 
limits placed on the right to freedom of expression need to be proportionate.
80
 The 
rationales for freedom of expression will be outlined before defining its scope in 
relation to news. This will be contrasted with the restrictions placed on freedom of 
expression by a statutory-based regulator compelling some news media entities to be 
regulated. Additionally, other professions that mandatorily regulate its practitioners will 
be compared and contrasted with news media. 
 
A Freedom of Expression  
  
1 Rationale for freedom of expression   
 
The three primary reasons for freedom of expression are: discovering the truth; 
individual autonomy and self-fulfilment; and a functioning democracy.81 Ancillary 
rationales include providing a check on public power and encouraging social debate 
through communication rather than violence.82 
 
Discovering the truth is based on the concept of a “marketplace of ideas”
83
 where 
“competing views of the truth clash together in open debate”84 to help people in their 
search for the truth. Restrictions should not be placed on the marketplace because truth 
is not absolute and restricting expression on the basis of falsity amounts to the restrictor 
implying there is an absolute truth, or an absolute falsity.85 An objectively correct or 
right view may only be attained when both sides of a view are in the marketplace and 
the contributors are forced to validate or defend their views.86  
 
Individual autonomy is based on the idea that the right to freely generate and share 
views for discussion and criticism is vital to one’s intellectual and spiritual 
development.87 However, it is arguable whether an unfettered freedom of expression 
fosters self-fulfilment, particularly when conflicting rights, such as rights to decency in 
                                                            
79 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
80 Claudia Geiringer and Steven Price “Moving from Self-Justification to Demonstrable Justification – the 
Bill of Rights and the Broadcasting Standards Authority” in Jeremy Finn and Stephen Todd Law, Liberty, 
Legislation (LexisNexis, Wellington, 2008) 295 at 319. 
81 Wojciech Sadurski Freedom of Speech and Its Limits (Kluwer Academic Publishers, Dordcrecht (The 
Netherlands), 1999) at 7-9. 
82 Geiringer and Price, above n 80, at 321. 
83 Eric Barendt Freedom of Speech (Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1985) at 8-23. 
84 Steven Price “The BSA and the Bill of Rights: A Practical Guide” (Broadcasting Standards Authority, 
Wellington, 2012) at 9. 
85 Barendt, above n 83, at 8. 
86 At 9. 
87 At 14. 
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relation to the expression of pornography,88 may be of equal or greater importance 
relative to that expression.
89
 It may be viewed as one of a bundle of rights that are 
generally required for holistic self-fulfilment,90 whereby other rights in the bundle take 
priority in some instances. 
 
Freedom of expression is imperative to a fully functioning democratic state for two 
reasons. Firstly, free expression is necessary to provide constituents with the 
information they need to carry out their democratic mandate. Secondly, free expression 
provides transparency to keep public representatives accountable to their actions.91 If 
such expression is constrained, there is a risk that the public will not be in a position to 
carry out the said purposes. For a democracy to be robust, these purposes must be 
fulfilled.  
 
2 Scope of freedom of expression 
 
Like any marketplace where all products are not of equal value, all expression is not of 
equal value. The extent to which expression furthers the aforementioned rationales will 
dictate its importance in the marketplace.
92
 The more a type of expression fulfils those 
purposes, the greater the justification needs to be to restrain that type of expression.  
 
Political speech, which is a subset of news, is given a “preferred position”
93
 by 
academics and the courts due to its democratic importance. It “encourages a well-
informed and politically sophisticated electorate [that is] able to confront government 
on more or less equal terms.”94 News provides an “exchange of information and ideas 
on matters relevant to the organisation of the economic, social and political life of the 
country”.
95
 Moreover, such expression provides diverse views to the marketplace of 
ideas to help ascertain the truth as well as aiding in the self-development of one’s 
intellect and spirituality.96 This can be contrasted with hate speech and pornography 
which do little to further the aforementioned rationales for freedom of expression and 
thus warrant less protection.97 
 
                                                            
88 Barendt, above n 83, at 16. 
89 At 15. 
90 At 15. 
91 Frederick Schauer Free Speech: A Philosophical Enquiry (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 
1982) at 36. 
92 Sarduski, above n 81, at 38. 
93 Barendt, above n 83, at 146. 
94 At 146. 
95 Campbell v MGN Ltd [2004] 2 AC 457 (HL) at [148]. 
96 Barendt, above n 83, at 146. 
97 Price, above n 84, at 10. 
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Due to its importance to individuals and society, news will be given a wide scope of 
protection under the right to freedom of expression. The strength of this protection will 
be analysed to ascertain whether regulation of the right will “demonstrably justified”. 98 
 
B Restricting Freedom of Expression 
 
The news media furthers the aforementioned rationales for the right to freedom of 
expression. This creates a paradox in that the news media must be allowed to carry out 
its function freely and without undue influence but at the same time, with the scope of 
the right being so wide, there is a high chance that the rights of individuals, such as 
one’s right to privacy, and the rights of the general public will be breached. The priority 
to be given to respective rights when a conflict arises must be assessed contextually. A 
regulator can arguably facilitate this analysis more effectively than the market. “There is 
a general agreement that free speech is not an absolute [right]”99 because of such 
inconsistencies.  
 
The news media “builds a bridge between public opinion and public policy.”100 This is 
magnified in New Zealand by the concentration in media ownership alluded to 
earlier.101 A distinct minority wields the power to influence the majority. Consequently, 
it is “almost universally accepted that there are circumstances in which free speech and 
a free press should be subject to restriction”.
102
  
 
As a result of the unique and pervasive power held by the news media, a social 
responsibility to the public that the power will be used in line with individual and public 
interests arises.103 This responsibility reflects the special privileges and exemptions 
afforded to the news media on the basis that they were the only ones with the means to 
fulfil some of society’s most important needs.104 Critics of a social responsibility theory 
think the public should bear the responsibility of protecting their own interests by 
analogising the news media to other industries that sell “a manufactured product at… 
[the consumer’s] own risk”.105 With new media providing an ever-increasing amount of 
                                                            
98 New Zealand Bill of Rights Act, s 5. 
99 Schauer, above n 91, at 134. 
100 The Hon R Finkelstein QC Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation 
(Report to the Minister for Broadband, Communications and the Digital Economy, Canberra, 2012) at 
[2.53] [Finkelstein Report]. 
101 Rosenberg, above n 63. 
102 Finkelstein Report, above n 100, at [2.47]. 
103 William Hocking Freedom of the Press: A Framework of Principle (The University of  Chicago Press, 
Chicago, 1947). 
104 Hocking, above n 103. 
105 Fred Siebert, Theodore Peterson and Wilbur Schramm Four Theories of the Press (University of 
Illinois Press, Illinois, 1956) at 73.  
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news and news commentary, it could be said that news media should not be burdened 
with a social responsibility. However, rather than being a substitute for traditional news 
media, new media complements the traditional news media because new media still 
relies on the traditional news media for the primary information that they then colour 
with opinion and commentary.
106
 Therefore, burdening the news media with a social 
responsibility is still justified.   
 
The standards and codes that news media have generally had to abide by relate to: 
accuracy; balance; fairness; good taste; and privacy. The BSA upheld ten per cent of 
complaints 2011/2012.
107
 This is a marked decrease from 2009/2010 and 2010/2011 
where over 29 and 23 per cent of complaints were upheld, respectively.108 The PC has 
upheld over 49, 44, and 45 per cent of complaints it determined in 2010, 2011 and 2012, 
respectively.
109
 Although these figures concern entertainment complaints as well as 
news complaints, it is evident that the news media does cause harm that is outside its 
right to freedom of expression. If there was no external regulator and freedom of 
expression was absolute, the news media could cause harm without an avenue of 
recourse for victims.  
 
C Other Professions 
 
Many professions demand that its professionals be mandatorily subject to a regulatory 
body that imposes standards of practice and an ethical code. For example, in New 
Zealand the New Zealand Law Society regulates legal professionals, the Medical 
Council of New Zealand regulates medical professionals and the New Zealand Institute 
of Chartered Accountants regulates accountants. These professions are regulated for 
three broad reasons: market failure; public interest; and private interest.
110
  
 
The New Zealand Law Society,111 the Medical Council of New Zealand112 and the New 
Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants
113
 are all statutorily-based, which gives 
weight to this paper’s recommendation for NMSA to be statutorily-based. The harm 
caused by the news media can be just as severe as other substandard professional 
                                                            
106 Big Picture Marketing Strategy and Research, above n 45, at [3.2].  
107 Broadcasting Standards Authority, above n 45, at 57. 
108 At 57. 
109 New Zealand Press Council 40th Report of the New Zealand Press Council (New Zealand Press 
Council, Wellington, 2012) at 13. 
110 Nuno Garoupa “Regulation of Professions in the US and Europe: A Comparative Analysis (April 
2004) The Berkeley Electronic Press <www.law.bepress.com> at 4. 
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112 Health Practitioners Competence Assurance Act 2003. 
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service. A tarnished reputation, trial by media or views formed on biased or inaccurate 
news not only affects individuals, but wider society. Moreover, a key distinction 
between the news media and other professions is that certain qualifications are a 
prerequisite to practice as a lawyer, doctor or accountant, whereas anyone can be a part 
of the news media with recent technological advancements. This provides more reason 
for the news media to be regulated because with no qualification requirements, the 
opportunity to teach proper standards and ethics during the qualification is not present 
like it is with other professions. 
 
V Recommended Model  
 
This paper recommends a mixed membership model for NMSA whereby some entities 
will be required to join the Authority whilst others can voluntarily join. A matrix of 
factors will be balanced by an independent panel to determine the entities that will be 
required to join NMSA. The Authority will be statutorily-based to provide 
enforceability in applying the matrix of factors. A definition of news media will also be 
adopted to restrict the entities that can voluntarily join NMSA. The Authority will be 
subject to judicial review because it is carrying out a public function and is statutorily-
based.114 The efficacy of the matrix can be judged by whether it encompasses the 
entities that should have their freedom of expression regulated and omitting those that 
should not.  
 
A Statutory Basis 
  
The Authority will be established by statute to ensure enforceability when requiring 
certain entities to join NMSA.115 The Authority will need to operate at arm’s length 
from the State to avoid perceptions of political influence. Similarly, the Authority will 
need be independent of the news media industry to avoid perceptions of it being self-
serving to the industry it is regulating.  
 
A minimalist statutory basis for the Authority will ensure independence whilst 
providing sufficient power to carry out its functions. A statutory model similar to that of 
the New Zealand Institute of Chartered Accountants will be used, as initially 
recommended by the Law Commission in its Issues Paper.116 
 
                                                            
114 The statute forming NMSA will expressly recognise that all its decisions are subject to judicial review.  
115 Law Commission The News Media Meets ‘New Media’: Rights, Responsibilities and Regulation in the 
Digital Age (NZLC IP27, 2011) at [6.119]. 
116 At [6.118]-[6.123]. 
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The Irish Press Council provides a good example of a statutorily-based media 
regulatory body that operates at arm’s length from the State. The Defamation Act,
117
 
which forms the Irish Press Council, adopts a minimalistic approach. It leaves matters 
such as the code of standards,118 funding calculations119 and handling complaints120 to 
the Press Council. The Danish Press Council
121
 also provides a good example of leaving 
the regulator to determine the substance of regulation whilst still being formed by 
statute.122 However, neither the Irish Press Council nor the Danish Press Council has a 
mixed membership model; the Irish Press Council is wholly voluntary and the Danish 
Press Council is wholly mandatory.123   
 
B Applying the Matrix  
 
There is potential for NMSA's governance to be adversely affected by agency issues. 
Those who run the Authority are incentivised to have more members so that funding 
and regulation coverage is greater. Therefore, it is important to have an independent 
governance structure that looks to first principles when applying the matrix. 
 
This paper will adopt the structure recommended by the Law Commission for the 
governance of the panel that will apply the matrix of factors.124 Independent 
appointments combined with a mix of people from a legal, media and public 
background ensures that the perspectives of all relevant stakeholders are considered.
125
 
Fixed terms for members with limited scope for removal will mitigate outside pressures 
affecting decisions.126 The onus will be on the panel to prove that an entity is required to 
join NMSA with structured reasoning in balancing the matrix of factors.  This panel will 
also carry out NMSA's adjudication function but the management of the Authority will 
be separate.
127
 
  
 
 
 
                                                            
117 Defamation Act 2009 (Ireland).  
118 Defamation Act, sch 2 s 10. 
119 Defamation Act, sch 2  s 7. 
120 Defamation Act, sch 2 s 8(1). 
121 Media Liability Act 1998 (Denmark), s 41. 
122 Lara Fielden “Regulating the Press: A Comparative Study of International Press Councils” (Reuters 
Institute for the Study of Journalism, Oxford, 2012) at 52. 
123 At 52. 
124 Law Commission, above n 1, at [7.30]-[7.34]. 
125 At [7.31]. 
126 At [7.362]. 
127 At [7.33].  
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C Matrix of Factors 
 
Numerous submitters to the Law Commission’s Issues Paper looked favourably upon a 
certain level of compulsion to NMSA’s jurisdiction.128 In its Issues Paper, the 
Commission contemplated the following criteria to determine compulsory 
membership:129 
 
 that the publication of news, and commentary on the news, is a significant 
part of the organisation’s enterprise; 
 that the publication is to the public or a section of the public; 
 that the publication is regular, rather than occasional; 
 that the publication is undertaken as a business or commercial activity; and 
 that the coverage of the news by the organisation is broad and general rather 
than confined to narrow specialisations.  
 
In 2010, Matthew Dearing recommended extending the BSA’s jurisdiction to the 
programming content provided by broadcasters via the internet.130  The extension would 
only be made to “Internet Broadcasters”.
131
 To determine what an “Internet 
Broadcaster” is,132 Dearing proposed a set of criteria which included factors such as:133 
 
 Is the broadcaster a large commercial organisation (i.e. does it have a large 
budget derived from advertising revenue)?  
 Does the broadcaster have paid staff (e.g. reporters, marketing team)?  
 Is the broadcaster a reputable source of news and factual information that a 
large part of the New Zealand public trust?  
 How large is the broadcaster’s audience (10 or 100,000)?  
 
After considering the two sets of factors above, the matrix will adopt the following two 
holistic factors:  
 
 a publication or programme’s influence on the public; and 
 the commerciality of the publisher or broadcaster. 
 
                                                            
128 Law Commission, above n 115, at [6.109]-[6.115]. 
129 At [6.113]. 
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The factors will have a range of sub factors for the panel to consider. Public influence 
and commerciality will need to be balanced; a non-commercial entity may still be 
required to join the Authority because of its influence on the public and a commercial 
entity may be required to join despite not materially influencing the public. Under the 
matrix, all entities that are currently regulated by the BSA or PC will be required to join 
NMSA. Several new media entities, namely Scoop.co.nz,134 Whale Oil Fish Hooked135 
(Whale Oil) and Kiwiblog,136 will also be required to join due to their influence on the 
public, rather than their commerciality. Trade publications, such as LawTalk,137 the 
New Zealand Law Society’s fortnightly magazine, have a material influence on the 
public and so should also be required to join NMSA.  
 
1 Influence on the public 
 
A publication or broadcast’s influence on the public is determined by the cross section 
of the public it is received by, the content it publishes and, to a lesser extent, the 
frequency of dissemination. The greater the audience, the greater the harm if the 
publication or broadcast is substandard. Likewise, the more frequent the publication or 
broadcast, the greater the likelihood that standards will be breached and harm occurs.  
 
Base figures will be used to bring entities to the attention of the panel but these figures 
will not limit the panel’s ability to consider other entities for compulsory membership. 
The true assessment of an entity’s influence on the public should be qualitative rather 
than quantitative because dealing solely with figures can be deceiving. Content can 
influence the public even if it is received by a small audience if that audience comprises 
influential people like politicians and celebrities. Likewise, a publisher or broadcaster 
that only produces content once a year can be influential if that content is consumed by 
many people. Thus, the relevance of audience numbers and frequency of dissemination 
is not about whether or not harm can occur, but the probability of harm occurring.  
 
The base figures should reflect the public’s trust and reliance on the source of the 
content: the higher the trust and reliance, the lower the threshold should be. Over 78 per 
cent of New Zealanders use television, newspapers or newspaper websites as their main 
source of news.
138
 In terms of reliance, 84 per cent of New Zealanders rely on the 
aforementioned channels for validity when faced with conflicting information from 
                                                            
134 Scoop.co.nz “Introducing Scoop.co.nz” <www.scoop.co.nz>. 
135 Cameron Slater “About” Whale Oil Beef Hooked <www.whaleoil.co.nz>. 
136 David Farrar “About Kiwiblog” Kiwiblog <www.kiwiblog.co.nz>. 
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138 Big Picture Marketing Strategy and Research, above n 47, at [3.2]. 
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different sources.139 Consequently, the thresholds for television, newspapers and 
newspaper websites should be lower than the thresholds for other news sources, such as 
small news websites, who are only relied on by eight per cent of the public, to ensure 
they are more likely to be required to join.   
  
The Australian Independent Inquiry into the Media and Media Regulation140 identified 
3,000 units of print per issue or a website having a minimum of 15,000 hits per annum 
as thresholds for being subject to regulation.141 It is admitted that these “numbers are 
arbitrary, but a line must be drawn somewhere”.142 New Zealand's smaller size dictates 
lower thresholds. This paper recommends 1,500 prints per issue, 8,000 unique website 
hits per annum and 20,000 unique viewers per annum as the base figures to bring an 
entity to the attention of the panel. These are not strict limits; the panel may require any 
entity that materially influences the public to join NMSA. 
   
By way of illustration, Scoop, Whale Oil, Kiwiblog and LawTalk would be regarded as 
having a material influence on the public. Scoop is the third most visited news website 
in New Zealand.143 Its audience is also likely to rely on the independence of its content 
because the content is declared to have "no spin".
144
 Whale Oil is primarily a news blog 
that has over 3,000,000 non-unique hits per month.145 Kiwiblog is mainly a political 
blog that has over 500,000 non-unique hits per month and 9,000 registered 
commenters.
146
 LawTalk circulates 12,400 copies per issue with 23 issues per year.
147
 
The audience of LawTalk includes influential people, such as members of the 
Judiciary.148 The audience size of these websites alone would mean that they have a 
material influence on the public. The content being primarily news adds to the potential 
for harm because of the important role of news in society. 
 
2 Commerciality 
 
A commercially oriented entity has more incentive to sacrifice standards and ethics than 
a non-commercial entity because doing so may lead to greater financial reward. 
Maintaining high standards and ethical reporting comes at a price: one must expend 
                                                            
139 Big Picture Marketing Strategy and Research, above n 45, at [4.3]. 
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time and money to ensure one is in line with relevant standards and codes. Increased 
competition from non-traditional media is likely to decrease an entity’s revenues. To 
maintain its profit margins, “ethical corner-cutting”149 may be used to reduce the 
operational costs associated with maintaining standards.  
 
There are factors other than commerciality that provide incentives to breach standards 
and ethics. For example: standards of fairness may be breached in presenting an 
ideological view; or standards of accuracy may be breached by taking a sensationalistic 
perspective of an event. Quantifying ideology or sensationalism is difficult and 
subjective. A viewpoint may be ideological to some, yet normal to others and a 
sensational view may be a result of a lack of resources making due diligence 
impractical. In contrast, commerciality is more objective because it is only money that 
is being considered.  
 
A commerciality analysis will be based on whether an entity is aiming to make a profit; 
aiming to make a profit will go towards the entity being required to join the Authority. 
The form of the entity, namely what it purports to be, is irrelevant; the focus will be on 
the substantive intention of the entity and whether it is seeking to profit from its 
operations. Factors such as eliciting excessive advertising or competitively 
remunerating staff, whilst not determinative, will be indicators of a profit-seeking 
entity. Whether in fact a profit is or is not made should not affect this analysis because 
intention to make a profit is the overarching concern. If an entity makes a loss in the 
pursuit of a profit, that may only incentivise it further to cut costs and in turn increase 
the likelihood of standards being breached.  
 
Attempting to outline absolute values for measuring an entity’s commerciality is futile 
because of the kaleidoscope of entities in the news media industry. Variables such as the 
size of the entity, the width of dissemination, the frequency of publication and sources 
of revenue would all affect a publisher’s profitability. Instead, the panel will take a case-
by-case approach to ascertain the true commercial intentions of an entity. Theoretically, 
being subject to a regulatory body will effectively be the trade-off an entity must make 
in order to make a commercial gain from being in the news media, all else being equal.   
 
D Voluntary Membership 
 
News media entities that are not required to join NMSA under the matrix will have the 
option to voluntarily join. The only requirement will be that the entity meets the 
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definition of news media. As outlined earlier, the Law Commission set out criteria to 
define news media,
150
 but this paper will not adopt that definition because it is overly 
prescriptive.  
 
News media must be defined more widely than the mandatory membership matrix for 
voluntarily membership to be operative. This paper recommends the following 
definition:  
 
“Any organisation or individual that disseminates news to a sector of the 
public.” 
 
A sector of the public will defined widely as it is only included to ensure that the 
content is available in the marketplace of ideas to inform opinion. Other factors such as 
frequency of publication, width of dissemination and commerciality are not required. 
The danger of chilling news related expression by not giving entities the opportunity to 
join NMSA to use the associated benefits outweighs the potential for abuse of privileges 
by errant members. The demands of membership, namely providing funding, should 
deter excessive membership. The panel will have the discretion to revoke membership if 
it is of the opinion that an entity is misappropriating its membership. The onus will be 
on the applicant to prove to the panel that it fits within the aforementioned definition.   
 
VI Potential Objections to the Recommended Model  
 
A Independence of NMSA 
 
A news media regulator being independent from the State and the news media industry 
is a preeminent concern, as expressed by a number of submissions to the Commission’s 
Issues Paper. By having the Authority statutorily-based rather than self-regulated, it is 
arguable that the State will have, or be perceived to have, influence over the Authority. 
Analogies are made with the BSA which is thought to have a “significant degree of 
State control”.
151
 State influence is undesirable because it may impede the news media’s 
ability to impart impartial information and in turn to hold the State accountable for its 
actions.  
 
This paper’s recommended statutory base can be materially differentiated from the 
BSA’s. The BSA relies on funding from the State to carry out its operations whereas 
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NMSA is wholly funded by the industry; state funding is only used for research 
purposes. “The State is a force in the setting of standards”
152
 for the BSA whereas the 
NMSA panel will be wholly responsible for setting standards. Moreover, the Governor-
General appoints the BSA’s chairperson and board members,153 whereas appointment to 
NMSA’s panel and adjudicatory body will be conducted by an independent group 
beyond State control. These differences ensure that the Authority is more independent 
from the State than the BSA.  
 
A mixed membership model also ensures more independence from the news media 
industry than a voluntary membership model. As outlined earlier, a voluntary 
membership model has the fundamental risk of being undermined in breadth of 
coverage and funding if a major member withdraws or does not join the Authority. In 
contrast, the mixed membership guarantees funding from the entities that are required to 
join, which will not only remove financial and coverage risk but also any leverage a 
large entity may have over the Authority.   
 
Furthermore, the assumption that State involvement compromises society’s interest in 
an impartial news media can be countered by an argument of accountability. A 
democratic government can be held accountable by constituents exercising their 
democratic mandate. It is more difficult to hold the news media industry to account 
because there is no such mandate and with news media power and ownership being 
concentrated, there is no viable alternative source for general news.  
 
Thus, the minimal statutory basis that this paper recommends will not compromise the 
Authority’s independence. A similar level of statutory backing formed the Irish Press 
Council and its ombudsman stated that, “freedom of the press in Ireland is not 
undermined by statutory recognition of the country’s press regulator”.154  
 
B Compulsion is Not Necessary to Avoid Harm to the Public 
 
The mixed membership model is premised on the idea that requiring certain news media 
entities to be regulated is justified to limit, and provide redress for, harm to the public. It 
is arguable that an element of compulsion is not in fact necessary and that if news media 
entities do not voluntarily join a regulatory body, any ensuing harm can be addressed by 
existing laws and the market. However, many individuals will be deterred from taking 
                                                            
152 Broadcasting Standards Authority “Submission to the Law Commission Issues Paper: The News Media 
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legal action because of the time and resources required to do so, as well as the 
uncertainty of success. 
 
With the internet being an ever-increasing source of news for consumers, there is a view 
that other consumers are able to hold the media to account for any breach of standards 
via comments on a webpage, blog or through social media.155 If this proposition holds, 
then an independent regulator is not necessary because the news media “will self-
correct”.156 This is an idealistic view and primarily deals with accuracy and fairness 
issues;157 privacy and decency issues will not addressed.158 The power imbalance 
between a large media entity and a disgruntled consumer may deter the latter from 
entering a public battle with the former.159 Moreover, information validity issues arise 
in that consumers may not know who to believe: a large media entity with resources, or 
an anonymous comment on a page.  
 
It is true that regulation may be undermined because of jurisdictional issues with 
overseas based entities that disseminate news in New Zealand. Legal restrictions mean 
that those entities cannot be required to join the Authority even if they met the matrix of 
factors. However, this issue may be overstated in New Zealand because international 
entities seldom report New Zealand news to a New Zealand audience. Moreover, any 
international entities that do report New Zealand news in New Zealand tend to be large 
organisations that have efficient in-house complaints systems. 
 
C Compulsion Will Chill Free Expression 
 
It is arguable that by compelling entities to join a regulatory body, their right to freedom 
of expression will be chilled and the public will not have a diverse and robust news 
media to accommodate their information needs. However, the proposed standards for 
NMSA are no more onerous than those of the BSA and PC. In fact, with the good taste 
and decency standard being left to the BSA, the proposed standards for NMSA are 
potentially more lenient than existing regulatory standards.160  
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From a journalist’s point of view, the BSA already “sets the bar too high”161 when 
interpreting its standards and codes. This suggests that expression will not be chilled 
simply by virtue of being subject to standards and codes but by the way those standards 
and codes are applied. This could be addressed by ensuring that the Authority only 
upholds decisions when it sees it as justifiable to limit the entity in question’s right to 
freedom of expression.162 Periodic reviews of the Authority and its adjudication 
function can ensure consistency and a proper balancing of rights is being undertaken. 
Remedially, the Authority not having the power to award monetary damages provides 
less reason for expression to be chilled relative to the BSA where monetary damages are 
awarded. Thus, a mixed membership model will not chill expression any more than it 
may already be chilled by the BSA and PC; any further chilling of expression, relative 
to a voluntary membership model, will be justified.  
 
VII Conclusion  
 
The traditional platform-centric approach to media regulation is no longer tenable with 
the distinct line between broadcast and print media being blurred by mainstream media 
combining text and video via the internet. NMSA, the universal news media regulator 
recommended by the Law Commission, takes a content-centric approach to regulation.  
 
This paper has concerns over the incentivised voluntary membership model endorsed by 
the Commission. It is arguable whether the Government would realistically premise the 
statutory exemptions and rights afforded to the news media upon being a member of 
NMSA. The benefits of a mediation service, brand advantage, avoiding the 
communications regime and access to public funding are overstated, depending on the 
entity. Moreover, having the option to join generates leverage for entities to potentially 
influence the formation and adjudications of the Authority. 
 
The right to freedom of expression is an important right that should not be restricted 
without proper justification. News media conveys information of utmost importance to 
society and consequently significant harm to individuals and the public can result if 
standards are not followed. Thus, like other professions, some regulation of the news 
media is necessary.  
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This paper recommends a mixed membership model that analyses an entity’s influence 
on the public and its commerciality to ascertain whether it should be required to join 
NMSA. The minimalistic statutory foundation recommended by this paper will increase 
the Authority’s overall independence and a wider definition of news media allows a 
greater range of entities to join NMSA. 
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